

**Did Obama's Ground Game Matter?
The Influence of Local Field Offices During the 2008 Presidential Election**

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Abstract

I examine the influence of campaign field offices during the 2008 general presidential election cycle. I find that the counties in which the Obama campaign had established field offices during the general election saw a disproportionate increase in the Democratic vote share, and that this field office-induced vote increase was enough to flip three battleground states from Republican to Democratic.

I am grateful for comments and suggestions from David Ciepley, Tom Cronin, James Gimpel, Hans Noel, Michael Potere, John Sides, Wayne Steger, and Nancy Wadsworth.

The post-election analysis in November of 2008 largely credited Obama's field organization for his victory in the presidential election. "One of the keys to Mr. Obama's success was building an unprecedented ground game manned by a multitude of idealistic, young voters," noted one observer (Jarmin 2008). Indeed, the importance of field organization seems to be one of the key lessons emerging from the contest and may define future election. As a former Republican officeholder remarked, "If you have the money, you can duplicate the model [Obama]'s got" (Sherry 2008).

With a bit of distance from the election, we are in a better position to assess the effect of field organization. To what extent did the Obama campaign's ground game matter in the general election? Did it mobilize voters, or would those voters likely have voted in similar numbers regardless of contact by the campaigns? And were Obama's successes more attributable to his campaign's actions or to simply having the good fortune to run against an unpopular incumbent's party during an economic crisis?

In this paper, I test the influence of Obama's local field offices on the county-level general election vote in 11 battleground states. The results suggest that Obama very likely would have won the national contest without these offices, but that the offices had a measurable impact on election, actually changing the results of several closely contested states.

Local Campaign Effects

Campaign effects are notably elusive from detection by political scholars. Berelson et al's (1954; 1948) finding that campaigns did little more than convince voters to do what they were already likely to do has been followed by a succession of studies showing that neither campaign spending nor advertising have particularly impressive

effects on voters (Polsby et al. 2008; Levitt 1994; Finkel 1993). Most of the noise generated by campaigns, that is, simply helps bring voters' preferences in line with the fundamentals of the political environment, including the state of the economy, the conditions of American foreign policy, and the popularity of the incumbent president (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992; Bartels and Zaller 2001; Rosenstone 1983; Gelman and King 1993).

Nonetheless, some recent evidence has demonstrated more subtle effects of campaigns. A well-orchestrated campaign, for example, can frame an election, guiding the public discussion of the campaign and of the political environment in a way that favors its candidate (Iyengar 1991; Vavreck 2009). Additionally, high-profile events by a presidential campaign, particularly convention speeches and visits by a candidate to an area, can produce a short-term boost in that candidate's favorability (Shaw 1999; Hillygus and Jackman 2003).

At the local level, experimental field evidence has shown that campaign contacts can boost voter turnout. Gerber and Green (2000) found that their randomized nonpartisan messages could increase voter turnout by roughly six percentage points (see also Imai 2005; Gerber and Green 2005). This study confirmed the results of earlier research showing that a modest campaign contact (in the form of a phone call or a flyer left at a door) could have a substantial impact on voter participation (Gosnell 1927; Eldersveld 1956; Eldersveld and Dodge 1954). These various studies, while demonstrating convincingly an important campaign effect, all share a common limitation: they use nonpartisan campaign messages to try to affect voters. With very few exceptions (Nickerson et al. 2006), and for obvious reasons, experimental studies have

avoided using the sorts of explicitly partisan messages that campaigns commonly employ.

This study seeks to address this gap in our knowledge with an observational study of a particular form of local campaigning: the use of campaign field offices. Little research has focused on field offices, although there are a few exceptions. Nate Silver (2008), for example, in a short post-election analysis, finds that Obama tended to outperform his polling numbers in states where voters reported disproportionate contact by his campaign (although see Sides 2008). Campaign journalists often focus on the “ground game,” as well, although such descriptions tend to laud the organization without testing its efficacy. For example, just prior to the 2004 Iowa Caucus, the *New York Times* devoted several column inches to describing Howard Dean’s and Richard Gephardt’s impressive field organizations, noting that “neither Mr. Edwards nor Mr. Kerry can claim the same scale of ground operation” (Purdum 2004: 1). Both Edwards and Kerry, however, finished well ahead of their more organized competitors in that contest (Cohen et al. 2008: 294).

Beyond such depictions, campaign field staff efforts receive little attention from scholarly research. To be sure, the considerable attention paid to presidential campaigns’ high profile speeches and use of television advertising is justified given how much money and effort campaigns devote to these activities. However, presidential campaigns also seek to target voters one-on-one. Indeed, door-to-door canvassing is widely seen as one of the most effective (if time consuming) activities in which a campaign can engage (Gerber and Green 2000). Canvassing activities, however, are extremely challenging to

coordinate at the national level.¹ Running a local canvassing operation involves recruiting large numbers of volunteers and sustaining their interest, generating and frequently updating neighborhood walking lists based on state or local electoral information, and making sure not only that volunteers are speaking with the appropriate local voters, but that they aren't alienating them. Local campaigns are ideally suited to these tasks.

In order to preserve some sense of continuity between the efforts of these local campaigns and the national one, the national campaign may establish field offices in critical areas throughout the state. Areas may be identified as critical because they contain a large number of supportive residents who are not regular voters, because there are a great deal of undecided voters there, or because an area contains many new registrants.

The Barack Obama 2008 presidential campaign makes for a particularly interesting subject for a study of local campaign organization. Blessed with enormous campaign coffers, this campaign was unusually aggressive in staffing field offices not just in state capitals, but also at dozens of locations in each of the battleground states. Since it was these offices' task to mobilize supportive voters in their immediate vicinities, we might be able to detect very localized campaign effects. In theory, that is, a field office in a county could send volunteers to hundreds or thousands of targeted households within the area, but such influence is not likely to be felt far beyond county lines. Volunteers tend to prefer to stay in their own communities, and voters are less likely to be influenced by campaigners from other communities (Nickerson and Feller 2008).

¹ For an entertaining look at just how complex this task can be, see Matt Bai's (2004) study of the 2004 Bush presidential campaign.

Counties themselves are important political entities with which voters identify (Aistrup 1993). An Obama campaign official confirms,

You wanted as many of your local people carrying your message as possible, as opposed to paid field organizers, or even imported volunteers from different parts of the country.... The more offices we had, the easier it was to empower your local organizers and your local volunteers to be part of that effort.... It was more efficient to have more offices (Rodriguez 2009).

For this study, I examine the influence of campaign activity at the county level. I use the establishment of a county-level field office as a measure of local campaign activity, and I look to see whether those counties with Obama field offices saw a disproportionately higher vote share for the Democratic presidential ticket.

The General Election

When seeking to measure the effect of a campaign's ground game, it is important to take account of national trends that affect voting behavior. We know, for example, that Obama significantly out-performed John Kerry's vote share from four years earlier, but he did so nearly uniformly across states, not just in those that saw campaign activity (Gelman 2008). Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of the two Democrats' vote shares by state; the correlation between the two votes is .92, with Obama receiving an average of 5.85 additional percentage points over Kerry's vote in each state. One could compliment Obama's campaign on the Democratic surge in such heavily contested states as Virginia or Indiana, but it's a stretch to credit the campaign for an increase in the Democratic vote in states like Utah, Idaho, and Vermont that saw essentially no campaign activity.

Figure 1

Figure 2 reproduces the same scatterplot within one of the battleground states. Here, the data points represent the Democratic presidential candidates' vote shares in Colorado's counties in 2004 and 2008. The diagonal line is an Obama = Kerry line; in every county, Obama exceeded Kerry's performance. Within Colorado, the correlation between the two years is even higher than it was nationally, with an r of .99.

Figure 2

I examined these county-level bivariate relationships within 11 battleground states,² and the results were virtually identical. The correlation between the Kerry and Obama votes was at least .955 in ten of the states; the lowest (Indiana) was .90. It is not terribly surprising to find a great deal of consistency in the vote from election to election, particularly within a state. Even as people move in and out of regions, states and counties preserve much of their partisan identity over time, particularly in an era of strong party polarization.

That said, there are variations between the two years that deserve notice. In Pennsylvania, for example, Obama improved on Kerry's performance by a full ten points in the southeastern county of Lancaster and yet fell a point short of Kerry's performance in the western county of Armstrong. What could account for these sorts of discrepancies?

² Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Kerry won only one of these (Pennsylvania) in 2004; Obama won all of them but Missouri. I limited the analysis to these states because of the closeness of the polling and election results there and because this was where the bulk of campaign activity occurred on both sides. The two presidential candidates visited these 11 states a combined total of 338 times between September 1st and election day, accounting for more than three quarters of all the candidate appearances during this time period. Of these states, Iowa received the fewest visits (nine) and Ohio the most (75) (Washington Post Staff 2008). These states were home to much of the field offices, advertising, and other forms of campaign expenditures and activities; any campaign effects should be found there.

One possibility is that the presence of an Obama county field office could have made the difference. (Notably, there was an Obama office in Lancaster County but not in Armstrong County.) Obama pursued an unusually aggressive field office effort in the 2008 election. Of the 877 counties under examination in these 11 states, Obama had opened at least one field office in 377 (43 percent) of them. Just in Pennsylvania, 40 (60 percent) of the state's 67 counties hosted Obama field campaign offices. Did these offices have an impact on the vote?

The graph in Figure 3 provides some suggestive evidence that campaign offices mattered. This figure shows the increase in the Democratic presidential vote from 2004 to 2008 for each county in Colorado. The counties on the right hosted Obama campaign offices; those on the left did not. Although there is a good deal of variance in the degree of this Democratic vote increase, the counties with Obama offices had, on average, a significantly higher increase (6.3 percent as opposed to 4.5 percent), and no county with an Obama office saw less than a three-point increase in the Democratic vote.

Figure 3

Of course, there are plenty of reasons why the counties might have varied in their relative embrace of Obama over Kerry, campaign offices being just one of them. It is possible, for example, that Obama saw his greatest Democratic vote increases in counties that have experienced high levels of population growth. That is, perhaps it is new residents, departing left-leaning coastal areas in search of less expensive housing options, who have helped to turn states blue (Frey and Muro 2008). It is also possible that Obama's share of the vote increased disproportionately in counties with high percentages of minority voters who participated at higher rates due to the presence of an African American on the national ballot (Wamsley 2008).

I therefore ran a regression model predicting the increase in the Democratic presidential two-party vote between 2004 and 2008, using each of the 877 counties in these eleven battleground states as units of analysis. (Two of these counties had insufficient demographic information and had to be dropped from the analysis.) The dependent variable ranges from -.084 to .171 with a mean Democratic vote increase of .046. I include a dummy variable that equals one for counties that hosted an Obama field office during the fall campaign and zero otherwise.³ I additionally employ a dummy variable equaling one if the Kerry/Edwards campaign had a field office in that county in 2004.⁴ The regression also includes an interaction term of the Obama and Kerry dummies. This specification allows us to distinguish any Democratic vote boost in counties where only Kerry had a field office, where only Obama had a field office, and where both candidates had established offices.

Economic conditions can, of course, influence vote choice both at the national and local level (Cho and Gimpel 2009). I have thus included the growth in the unemployment rate in each county between July and October of 2008 as a variable.⁵ Also included in the equation are variables measuring the county population growth between 2003 and 2007, the percent of the county that is African American, the percent that is Latino, the median age, the median income,⁶ and the total population of the

³ Information on the location of Obama/Biden offices comes from the campaign website, which listed all offices by county and state (<http://www.barackobama.com/>).

⁴ Information on the location of Kerry/Edwards and McCain/Palin offices comes from George Washington University's Democracy in Action websites (<http://www.gwu.edu/%7Eaction/2004/kerry/kerrgenstates.html> and <http://www.gwu.edu/%7Eaction/2008/mccain/mccainorg.html#s>).

⁵ County-level unemployment figures were collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (<http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm>).

⁶ Race, age, growth, and income statistics come from the U.S. Census. The most recent complete county income figures, unfortunately, are from 1999. However, they should still prove a reasonable indicator of relative county wealth.

county. Additionally, I include the Kerry percentage of the two-party vote in 2004 to control for the possibility that the Obama campaign might have selected disproportionately liberal (or conservative) counties to host its offices. A conversation with Matt Rodriguez (2009), the western states director for Obama-Biden 2008, confirmed that this was an exhaustive list of factors that the campaign used to select the location of field offices.⁷ I ran a fixed-effects regression, controlling for state. The results of this regression can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1

As this table shows, most of the suggested causes of increased Democratic vote shares were positive and statistically significant ($p \leq .001$). The presence of an Obama field office was associated with a 0.8 percentage point increase in the Democratic vote share. The presidential contests in North Carolina and Missouri were settled by margins smaller than this, and Indiana's margin was only slightly greater. Thus this campaign expenditure seems like a particularly useful allocation of resources.

Notably, neither the Kerry office coefficient nor the interaction variable was statistically significant. This suggests that the Obama campaign succeeded where it went beyond what the Kerry campaign had done. In counties where both campaigns had set up offices, there was no net boost to the Democratic vote in 2008. However, Kerry had only established 125 county-level offices in these 11 states to Obama's 377. Obama saw the boost to his vote share, these figures tell us, when he set up an office in places that Kerry never did.

⁷ According to Rodriguez, "We modeled out the voters pretty closely as to who we thought, when hearing the Obama message, were likely to come to us." The primary factors he listed as important to locating field offices were population size, voting history, racial makeup, and proximity to a college or university.

Unsurprisingly, economic conditions appeared to affect vote choice. Each percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate was associated with a 0.6-point increase in the Democratic vote share over the 2004 baseline, a result that was statistically significant ($p \leq .001$). While county growth and population size seemed largely irrelevant, counties with high numbers of African Americans and Latinos saw disproportionate rises in the Democratic vote share. The coefficient for Latinos was actually twice that of African Americans, suggesting considerably greater activation of Latino Democratic voting by Obama. Age had a negative and statistically significant relationship with the Democratic vote increase, consistent with other evidence that younger voters became substantially more Democratic between 2004 and 2008 (Gelman and Sides 2009). Income, interestingly, had a positive effect, suggesting that Obama was able to make gains in some wealthier counties that had eluded Kerry. Finally, the Kerry share of the 2004 vote had a negative relationship with the Democratic vote increase, suggesting that Obama saw a greater Democratic vote increase within more conservative areas than within more liberal ones.

Obama, of course, wasn't actually competing against John Kerry so much as he was against another senator, John McCain. In Table 2, I have specified the regression equation somewhat differently, using Obama's share of the two-party vote as the dependent variable. I have replaced the Kerry county field office variable with a McCain county field office one, and I have interacted it with the Obama field office variable. Otherwise, the two equations are specified identically.

Table 2

The Obama county field office coefficient is again positive and statistically significant, and the coefficients on the other control variables are essentially the same as

they were in Table 1. One surprising finding, however, is that McCain's field office presence had a positive impact on Obama's vote share, although this coefficient is not statistically significant. Somewhat less surprising is that the interaction term is negative, suggesting that McCain was able to check Obama's gains in counties where both candidates had a field office presence. Statistically, however, this result is indistinguishable from zero. The overall lesson of this table is that Obama's field offices were helpful to their candidate while McCain's were not.⁸

These findings are consistent with the notion that local campaign organizations may be pivotal in elections. Interestingly, however, while these findings are robust in the aggregate, they do not hold within most of the battleground states. When the regressions are run within states, the county campaign office variable only remains statistically significant for Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina. The second column in Table 3 shows the county field office coefficient (as derived from Table 1) for each of the eleven battleground states.⁹ Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficients.

Table 3

Even if the presence of a campaign office didn't seem to matter in some states, however, this table suggests that it was determinative in others. The third column in this table shows Obama's actual share of the two-party vote in each of the states. In the fourth and fifth columns, I have removed a share of Obama's vote commensurate with the size of the field office coefficient from each of the counties that hosted such an office.

⁸ Another way of modeling these equations is in the form of a two-stage least squares regression, using the Obama office variable as the instrument, the unemployment rate and the McCain or Kerry office variable as exogenous variables, and the other control variables as endogenous ones predicting the likelihood of Obama establishing an office in the first place. Such models are designed to compensate for endogeneity of variables. The results of this model, however, are substantively identical to those produced in Tables 1 and 2.

⁹ State level coefficients derived from Table 2 were substantively similar to those derived from Table 1.

The fourth column shows the resulting Obama vote share if all those voters had instead voted for Republican John McCain. The fifth column shows the resulting vote share if those voters had instead declined to vote.

In three of these states – Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina – Obama won the actual election but would have lost if the contacted voters had voted for McCain. McCain would also have won Indiana and North Carolina had the contact voters simply chosen to stay home on Election Day. These three states were worth a total of 53 electoral votes – not enough to actually cost Obama the White House, but certainly enough to make it a much closer election.

It is curious that this effect is not statistically significant within each of the 11 states. This may be due at least in part to the smaller number of cases within states – it is easier to detect modest but important effects among 875 counties than among just a few dozen (Nevada has only 17 counties). But there are likely other forces at work here. One hesitates to make strong inferences from a dataset of 11 states, but it is possible to conjecture about the relative influence of field offices.

As Figure 4 suggests, the effect of field offices may decline as a state becomes saturated with them. This scatterplot shows the state-level Obama field office coefficients (as shown in Figure 3) plotted against the proportion of counties with such field offices. With the exception of two outlier states (Florida and Missouri), the data form a nearly perfect downward-sloping line, suggesting that as a state's counties become inundated with field offices, effectiveness is compromised. This relationship is statistically significant ($p = .014$). It is possible that the large number of offices confuses or irritates volunteers who get multiple requests for duty from various sources. It may

also be that the campaign placed a greater focus on building offices in some states than on developing a strategy for their use.

Figure 4

Another possibility, demonstrated in Figure 5, is that the effectiveness of field offices is a function of the closeness of the election. As the scatterplot shows, the field office coefficient for each state generally declined as the final pre-election polls showed the state to be safer for Obama. The field offices tended to be most effective where they were most needed – in states where that extra percentage point could make the difference between a win and a loss. There is a certain logic to this explanation, as field offices are highly dependent on volunteers to execute their strategy, and volunteers can read polls and news stories well enough to know how competitive their state is and how useful their contribution would be.

Figure 5

This examination of state-to-state differences in field office effectiveness should be considered preliminary in nature, as the number of cases is so small. It is certainly possible that these differences simply come down to the technique, skill, and organizational abilities of the offices' directors. Future research may shed light on how local campaign officials were able to boost vote shares in some states but not in others.

Discussion

As the evidence presented in this paper suggests, the establishment of a local field office by a presidential campaign can yield modest but important dividends for a candidate. Obama's decision to establish hundreds of county-level offices helped to

boost his vote share by almost one point overall and by more than three points within some states.

When analyzing any campaign effect, it is worth asking whether it matters. The general election analysis suggests that three states, worth 53 electoral votes, may have gone Obama's way because of the effective allocation of field offices. While those electoral votes weren't pivotal in this contest, they were certainly enough to turn a tossup into an Electoral College blowout.

Any observational study, this one included, is potentially vulnerable to the criticism that correlation does not equal causation. That is, perhaps Obama would have received roughly the same vote shares in the counties with field offices had those offices never been erected. Perhaps the campaign simply established offices in those counties that were already looking very promising for the campaign.

This is certainly possible, but it doesn't seem particularly likely. The main objection to this interpretation is that I have controlled for basically every political variable (racial demography, population age, previous voting behavior, population size and growth) that the Obama campaign used in deciding where to allocate its resources among the 877 counties in these 11 battleground states. Even controlling for all these variables, the presence of a field office was still associated with a significant vote boost over the 2004 baseline and a significant increase in the Democratic share of the two-party vote. Of course, further research, both observational and experimental, into the influence of field offices could increase our confidence in these findings.

Interestingly, the McCain field offices proved considerably less effective than the Obama ones. The McCain coefficient was statistically significant and in the correct direction in only one state (New Mexico), and it was dwarfed by Obama's 15-point

victory margin there. Again, though, a field office can only be as effective as its volunteers, and as was often reported (Quinn 2008; The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2008), the McCain campaign had difficulty attracting enthusiastic supporters. It seems fair to say, however, that the Republican Party faced an unusually daunting array of crises in 2008; parties are usually better able to attract enthusiastic volunteers, and thus field offices are likely to be somewhat more effective than McCain's were.

What this study ultimately suggests is that, in an era when campaigns sink more and more money into television advertisements with less and less to show for it, shoe leather may be a wiser investment. Not only does it appear to be more effective in securing votes, but it also produces a number of positive externalities that we say we want from campaigns: greater individual involvement in politics, increased neighbor-to-neighbor contact, the education of volunteers and contacted citizens about the issues of the day, and increased feelings of efficacy among participants. Compared to television advertising – much of which is negative in tone, does not encourage volunteerism, and may engender cynicism and even reduce turnout – the staffing of local campaign offices may be the better choice not only for campaigns, but for the nation as well.

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Table 1 - Variables Predicting Democratic Vote Increase, 2004-2008

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Obama county field office, 2008	0.008*** (0.002)
Kerry county field office, 2004	0.005 (0.010)
Obama office × Kerry office	-0.013 (0.011)
Increase in unemployment (July – October, 2008)	0.006*** (0.001)
Percent growth, 2003-07	0.006 (0.020)
Percentage African American	0.068*** (0.011)
Percentage Latino	0.125*** (0.015)
Median age	-0.001*** (0.000)
Median income (in thousands)	0.001*** (0.000)
County population (in thousands)	0.00001 (0.000)
Kerry share of two-party vote, 2004	-0.043*** (0.011)
Constant	0.060*** (0.013)
Observations	875
R-squared	0.146

Note: Cell entries are fixed-effects regression coefficients, controlling for state, predicting the increase in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote between 2004 and 2008. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks (***) p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05).

Table 2 - Variables Predicting Obama's Share of the Two-Party Vote, 2008


<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>
Obama county field office, 2008	0.006* (0.002)
McCain county field office, 2008	0.010 (0.007)
Obama office × McCain office	-0.004 (0.007)
Increase in unemployment (July – October, 2008)	0.006*** (0.001)
Percent growth, 2003-07	0.007 (0.020)
Percentage African American	0.068*** (0.011)
Percentage Latino	0.128*** (0.015)
Median age	-0.001*** (0.000)
Median income (in thousands)	0.001*** (0.000)
Total number of voters (in thousands)	0.0000008 (0.000)
Kerry share of two-party vote, 2004	0.953*** (0.011)
Constant	0.059*** (0.013)
Observations	875
R-squared	0.895

Note: Cell entries are fixed-effects regression coefficients, controlling for state, predicting the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in 2008. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by asterisks (***) $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$).

Table 3 -- State-Level Field Office Coefficients and Impact on Election


<u>State</u>	Field office coefficient (Standard error)	Actual Obama share of two- party vote	Obama two- party vote share if contacted voters had supported <u>McCain</u>	Obama two- party vote share if contacted voters hadn't <u>voted</u>
Colorado	0.006 (.008)	0.544	0.538	0.541
Florida	0.033*** (.008)	0.514	0.487	0.500
Indiana	0.031* (.012)	0.505	0.488	0.497
Iowa	0.010 (.007)	0.547	0.539	0.544
Missouri	0.005 (.005)	0.499	0.496	0.497
Nevada	0.011 (.010)	0.564	0.553	0.559
New Mexico	-0.014 (.011)	0.574	0.587	0.579
North Carolina	0.014** (.005)	0.502	0.491	0.497
Ohio	-0.008 (.007)	0.519	0.526	0.522
Pennsylvania	-0.005 (.008)	0.542	0.547	0.544
Virginia	-0.0002 (.006)	0.531	0.532	0.532

Figure 1 - Consistency of the Two-Party Vote, 2004-2008



Note: Each data point is a state, charted by its Democratic vote for president in 2004 and 2008. The diagonal line is the Obama=Kerry line; if a state is above that line, then Obama outperformed Kerry in that state.

Figure 2 - 2004 and 2008 Presidential Vote Shares in Colorado Counties



Note: Each data point is a Colorado county, charted by its Democratic vote for president in 2004 and 2008. The diagonal line is the Obama=Kerry line; if a county is above that line, then Obama outperformed Kerry in that state.

Figure 4 - Effect of Obama Field Offices by Office Saturation





Figure 5 - Effect of Obama Field Offices by State Competitiveness



Polling data source: Real Clear Politics
(http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/us/general_election_mccain_vs_obama-225.html)